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Abstract. We introduce a new centrist or intermediate inequality concept, be-
tween the usual relative and absolute notions, which is shown to be a variant
of the a-ray invariant inequality measures in Pfingsten and Seidl (1997). We
say that distributions x and y have the same x; p-inequality if the total
income di¤erence between them is allocated among the individuals as follows:
100p% preserving income shares in x, and 1001ÿ p% in equal absolute
amounts. This notion can be made as operational as current standard methods
in Shorrocks (1983).
I. Introduction
Most welfare analysis implicitly assume that social or aggregate welfare can
be expressed in terms of only two features of the income distribution: the
mean, and a notion of vertical inequality. In this context, we are often inter-
ested in evaluation methods which require the minimum possible number of
value judgments. In particular, we are interested in unambiguous (although
incomplete) rankings according to which social welfare increases only if e‰-
ciency and distribution both improve.
Dutta and Esteban (1991) show that for this procedure to be justified,
among other things we need to specify the type of mean-invariance property
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we want our inequality indices to satisfy (see also Ebert 1987; Weinhardt
1993). Starting from a given income distribution x, two polar cases have been
extensively studied so far: a preference for e‰ciency along rays through x
from the origin, maintaining constant a relative notion of inequality; and a
preference for e‰ciency along rays through x parallel to the line of equality,
maintaining constant an absolute notion of inequality. The merit of Shor-
rocks’s (1983) contribution is that he develops operational methods to find out
whether one distribution is unambiguously better than another according to
all SEFs in wide classes of admissible functions in the relative and the absolute
case (for the absolute case, see also Moyes 1987).
In Del Rı´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1996) we have found with this methodology
that the 1990 1991 income distribution has less relative inequality but more
absolute inequality than the 1980 1981 comparable distribution1. The fol-
lowing empirical question cannot be answered with present tools: is the 1990
1991 distribution ‘‘barely better’’ than the 1980 1981 distribution from the
relative point of view, and consequently ‘‘far away’’ from it from the absolute
one; or is ‘‘so much better’’ from the relative perspective that is ‘‘nearly
equivalent’’ to it from the absolute point of view?
To approach this question, we suggest to consider the space of ‘‘centrist’’ or
intermediate views on inequality, between the ‘‘rightist’’ (relative) or ‘‘leftist’’
(absolute) cases in Kolm (1976a, b)’s value laden terminology. Informally, in
the situation of the example we are interested in knowing how far we can go to
the left of the political spectrum within the centrist space, and still claim that
the 1990 1991 distribution is less unequal than the 1980 1981 distribution.
To develop this idea we must start by specifying an appropriate notion of
intermediate inequality. One possibility is to use Kolm’s (1976a, b) suggestion
or the single parameter m-inequality concept proposed by Bossert and Pfings-
ten (1990). Unfortunately, as pointed out by Pfingsten and Seidl (1997) (or PS
for short), both share a serious disadvantage: they approach the rightist posi-
tion when aggregate income rises, even if the income distribution becomes
more unequal according to some inequality measure2.
Another possibility is to use the ray-invariance concept suggested by PS,
which gives rise to a wide class of a-invariant inequality measures free from
this flaw. In this paper we introduce a new class of inequality measures which
is a subset of the a-invariant class. We call it x; p-inequality to stress the
dependence on an initial income distribution x, as well as on a parameter
value p in the unit interval. Like all other notions, it builds upon a monoto-
nicity property conveying the proper division of extra income to leave in-
equality intact. We say that x and y have the same x; p-inequality if the total
income di¤erence between the two distributions is allocated among the indi-
1 Except for Portugal, who has gone through similar political and economic reforms
since the mid 1970’s, this is a di¤erent trend from most OECD countries. For Portugal
(see Gouveia and Tavares 1995, Rodrigues 1993), and for the international experience
(see, for instance, Atkinson et al. 1995, Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997).
2 For other shortcomings of Kolm’s (1976) approach (see Bossert and Pfigsten 1990).
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viduals as follows: p100% preserving income shares in x, and 1ÿ p100% in
equal absolute amounts.
Our reason for defending the new notion is twofold. It has a clear norma-
tive interpretation, and it can be made operational in the following way.
Given an initial distribution x and a value of p, we develop empirical methods
to test whether any distribution y has greater social welfare than x according
to all SEFs in a class characterized by the usual assumptions plus a monoto-
nicity property compatible with the x; p-inequality concept. Suppose now we
want to analyze the Spanish situation during the 1980’s, an interesting period
in which a socialist party occupied power by democratic means for the first
time in 40 years. The problem is that we do not have any a priori reasons to
determine which centrist attitudes, or which range of p values, we should adopt
to compare the two distributions. Our strategy is to allow the data to reveal
this for us: we estimate the range of p values for which the 1990 1991 distri-
bution is non comparable to the 1980 1981 distribution. In this way, we learn
for what type of centrist attitudes there has been a reduction or an increase (to
the ‘‘right’’ or the ‘‘left’’ of that range of p values, respectively) in inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. Section II presents our
notion of intermediate inequality within the larger class of a-ray invariant
inequality measures proposed by PS. Following up on ideas put forth in
Chakravarty (1988), Sect. III describes how our measure can be made opera-
tional by using Lorenz comparisons. Section IV concludes. Proofs are
included in an Appendix.
II. Ray invariant inequality concepts
II.1. Notation
Let x  x1; . . . ; xH A RH; 2UH <y, denote an income distribution with
x1 U x2 U . . . U xH . Then D denotes the set of all possible ordered income
distributions in RH, and S the H-dimensional simplex. For any x A D, let
vx  v1; . . . ; vH A S be the vector of income shares with vh  xh=X , where
X  Shxh is the aggregate income. 1 denotes a row vector whose components
are all ones, while e denotes the vector 1=H 1 in S. For any two vectors
x; y A D, let vxLvy denote weak Lorenz dominance.
Any real valued function I defined on D satisfying continuity, S-convexity
and population replication invariance is called an income inequality measure.
I :  satisfies scale invariance when Ix  Ilx for all x A D and for all
l > 0. I :  satisfies translation invariance when Ix  Ix h1 for all x A D
and for all h A R such that x h1 A D. If an inequality measure satisfies
scale or translation invariance it is called a relative or an absolute inequality
measure, respectively.
II.2. Centrist inequality attitudes
It appears to be the case that, for technical or other reasons, the vast majority
of specialists prefer the relative notion. However, first Dalton (1920) and later
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Kolm (1976a, b) observe that many people perceive equiproportional
increases in all incomes to increase, and equal incremental increases in all
incomes to decrease income inequality. He called such an attitude centrist.
The conceptual interest of such views has been enhanced by recent reports on
questionnaires which indicate that people are by no means unanimous in their
choice between relative, absolute and other intermediate or centrist notions of
inequality3. As indicated in the conclusions to Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo
(1993), if because of the influence of political attitudes to redistribution or
other unknown concerns people in large numbers declare to favor absolute
or intermediate inequality concepts, then perhaps it is time to change the
consensus and use more often other types of inequality measures. This is
indeed what Kolm himself, as well as Bossert, Pfingsten and Seidl, for exam-
ple, recommends.
As pointed out in PS, a centrist income inequality attitude can be modeled
in various ways. For all x A D, there exists a set of income distributions Ex
such that, first, all y A Ex are perceived to be as equally distributed as x,
second, for lx > x and x h1 > x all y A Ex are perceived to be more
equally distributed than lx and less equally distributed than x h1, and
third, for x > lx and x > x h1 all y A Ex are perceived to be less equally
distributed than lx and more equally distributed than x h1. Given such a
centrist inequality attitude, the question arises whether there are E-invariant
income inequality measures, i.e., inequality measures I :  such that Ix 
Iy for all y A Ex.
As PS indicate, a straightforward case is to assume Ex to be composed of
rays through x4. For any a A S, the set Eax of a-rays through x is defined by
Eax  fy A D : y  x ta; t A Rg:
In accordance with centrist ideas, PS require a-rays to be restricted in two
ways: first, they Lorenz dominate the original distribution; and, second, they
are more unequally distributed than translation invariance would require.
Thus, given an income distribution x A D, define the set Wx of value judg-
ments (in income share form) which provide a reduction in relative inequality
3 For example (see Amiel and Cowell 1992, Harrison and Seidl 1994, Seidl and Theilen
1994). In the Spanish case, Ballano and Ruiz Castillo (1993) found that, for the sub
sample that showed an acceptable degree of consistency over the questionnaire, only 31
percent supported a relative view of inequality, 24% supported an absolute view, and
27% an intermediate notion (the rest supported other extreme views).
4 As an alternative, consider the Krtscha (1994) intermediate inequality concept in
which, given an initial income distribution x A D, any extra income M should be allo
cated among the individuals according to the so called ‘‘fair compromise concept’’: the
first extra dollar of income should be distributed so that 50 cents go to the individuals
in proportion to the initial income shares, and 50 cents in equal absolute amounts;
starting from the new distribution with aggregate income equal to X  1, the second
extra dollar of income should be allocated in the same manner, and so on. Notice that,
according to this notion, the set of income distributions with the same intermediate
inequality as x is no longer a ray but a parabola.
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but an increase in absolute inequality relative to x:
Wx  fa A S : eLaLvxg:
In other words, given x A D and a A Wx, every y A Eax is derived from x
by superimposing a ‘‘more equal’’ income distribution according to the Lor-
enz criterion.
To understand in which sense x and a co-determine the domain of a-ray
invariant functions, define the set Ga of income distributions for which a A S
can represent a centrist inequality attitude:
Ga  fx A D : aLvxg:
Clearly, if x A D and a A S but a B Wx or x B Ga, then the pair x; a does
not give rise to a centrist inequality relation. Accordingly, a real valued func-
tion Fa : D! R is called a-ray invariant in Ga, if and only if for each x A
Ga,
Fax  Fay for all y A Eax:
Given an a-ray invariant function Ia : , we say that it is an a-ray invariant
inequality measure if, in addition, it is continuos, S-convex and satisfies the
population replication axiom.
In general, a-ray invariance requires an inequality measure not to change
provided any income change is distributed according to the value judgment
represented by the relative pattern a. Thus, let x  200; 800, so that vx 
0:2; 0:8, and, for example, let a  0:4; 0:6 so that eLaLvx. Then
Eax  fy A R2 : y  200; 800  t0:4; 0:6; t A Rg:
Therefore, if we have 100 units of extra income to allocate, to preserve such a-
ray invariance we must add up the vector 40; 60 to x to reach 240; 860.
II.3. A new concept of intermediate inequality
In principle, given two distributions x; y A D, we could search for t and a so
that y is a-ray invariant inequality equivalent to x , that is, y  x ta. In
practice, t is given by the total income di¤erence between the two dis-
tributions under comparison. In what follows, we assume without loss of
generality that tV 0. On the other hand, if the two distributions have the
same number of individuals, we can always compute a  uÿ t=t5. The
problem is that, in general, the a vector will not have a convenient interpre-
tation. For instance, in the empirical illustration with Spanish data we would
have a 24,000-dimensional a vector. It would be hard to interpret what is
meant by people having more or less demanding inequality views than those
represented by such a vector.
5 Otherwise, we can substitute the original distributions by their centiles, for example,
and apply the previous expression.
5
We concentrate our attention on a-ray invariant inequality measures
which can receive a clear normative interpretation. For that purpose, we start
from an initial income distribution x A D, and a value of p A 0; 1. Then we
consider rays through y A D constructed so that p100% of any extra income is
allocated to individuals according to income shares in x, and 1ÿ p100% in
equal absolute amounts. That is, we define
Px;py  fz A D : z  y tpvx  1ÿ pe; t A Rg:
Clearly, if we let a  pvx  1ÿ pe, then Px;py  Eay. Correspond-
ingly, we define the subset G 0a of income distributions for which a can rep-
resent a centrist inequality attitude in the following sense:
G 0a  fx A D : p 0vx  1ÿ p 0e  a for some p A 0; 1g:
Clearly, for any x A G 0a; aLvx. This means that G 0aHGa. Then we say
that a real valued function Ix;p : D! R is a x; p-inequality measure in
G 0a, if and only if it is the restriction to G 0a of the Ia-ray invariant in-
equality measure. In this case, of course,
Ix;py  Ix;pz for all z A Px;py:
Alternatively, we have that
Iay  Iaz for all z A Eay6:
In general, the set G 0a is clearly non-empty7, so that the x; p-inequality
measures are well defined. This means that they enjoy all the properties dis-
cussed by PS for a-ray invariant inequality measures.
If we let x  200; 800 as before and p  0:5, then 50% of all income dif-
ferences are allocated according to the income shares vector 1=5; 4=5, and
50% in equal absolute amounts according to the proportions 1=2; 1=2. Thus,
the x; p-ray of income distributions through x is given by
Px;px  fy A R : y  x t7=20; 13=20; t A Rg:
Hence, 100 extra units of income are allocated as 35; 65 to reach the new
distribution 235; 865 with the same x; p-inequality. Informally, we may say
that a value of p  0:9 reflects a center-right attitude, while a value of p  0:4
reflects a center-left perception of inequality. The reason, of course, is that
according to the first view inequality is maintained if only 10% of any excess
income is distributed according to the more demanding absolute criterion,
while the second requires 60% to be allocated that way. On the other hand,
6 In the 2 dimensional case, all distributions y in Ga have the property that a
p 0vy  1 p 0e for some p 0 A 0; 1. This means that G 0a and Ga coincide, in which
case the x; p inequality and the a ray invariant inequality concepts also coincide. In
general, of course, the set Ga is much richer than G 0a.
7 Similarly, the subset W 0x of Wx, defined by W 0x fa A S : a p 0vx  1 p 0e
for some p 0 A 0; 1g, is also non empty.
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notice that if p  1; x; p-inequality becomes the relative view, whereas p  0
leads to the absolute view.
The dependence of centrist or intermediate inequality measures on an ini-
tial situation deserves to be emphasized. Some readers may find this a disad-
vantage because a certain value judgment is not applicable in all situations.
However, we agree with PS when they assert that ‘‘. . . this is indeed an at-
tractive feature . . . The meaning of ‘‘centrist’’ need not be decided universally,
but can be made contingent on the situations we know and hence can evaluate
well’’. Nevertheless, the way a-inequality and x; p-inequality depend on the
initial situation present some subtle di¤erences worth being discussed.
As we know, a0 A S and x A D can only give rise to a centrist inequality
relation if x A Ga0 and a0 A Wx. Given y A Ga0, if y A Ea0x then
Ia0y  Ia0x. Otherwise, i.e. if y B Ea0x, then we can only say that x and y
do not have the same a0-inequality. In our case, given x0 A D and p0 A 0; 1;
a0  p0vx0  1ÿ p0e is determined. Consider now two income distributions
x; yG 0a0. Then there exists some p; p 0 A 0; 1 such that a0  pvx  1ÿ pe
and a0  p 0vy  1ÿ p 0e. This means that x; p-inequality and y; p 0-
inequality coincides with x0; p0-inequality. The interpretation is clear: the
same centrist attitude is captured when, starting from x; p100% of the income
di¤erence between X and Y is allocated according to vx and 1ÿ p100% in
equal absolute amounts, as when, starting from y; p 0100% of the income dif-
ference is allocated according to vy and 1ÿ p 0100% in equal absolute
amounts. This can be understood as follows. Suppose first that y A Px;px,
so that x; y have the same x; p-inequality. Then, as we show in Proposi-
tion 1.i, p 0  pX  t= X  pt. Assume without loss of generality that
Y ÿ X > 0. Then y has less relative inequality than x and p 0 > p. Thus, to get
down to x from y so as to preserve intermediate inequality, we can follow the
pattern vy more closely than the pattern vx from x; in other words, when we
compare income distributions x and y from the viewpoint of the latter, the p 0
which ensures that Iy;p 0y  Iy;p 0x is closer to 1 than p. On the other
hand, if y B Px;px, then we can only state that x and y do not have the same
x; p-inequality but, according to Proposition 1. ii, p 0V p whenever yLx.
To appreciate the di¤erences between a0-inequality and x0; p0-inequality
from a di¤erent perspective, suppose a situation in which x1 and x2 are the
income distributions of country A in two moments of time, while y1 and y2
correspond to the same situation in country B. Given a0, assume that x1 and
x2, as well as y1 and y2, have the same a0-inequality. In our case, given x0 A D
and p0 A 0; 1; a0  p0vx0  1ÿ p0e is determined. Assume that both x1 and
x2, and y1 and y2, have the same x0; p0-inequality. We know that there exist
p; p 0 A 0; 1 such that a0  pvx1  1ÿ pe and a0  p 0vy1  1ÿ p 0e. Sup-
pose, for instance, that y1Lx1. Regardless of whether y1 A Px0;p0x1 or not,
by Proposition 1.ii we know that p 0V p. Of course, x1; p-inequality and
y1; p 0-coincide with x0; p0-inequality, but the fact that p 0V p reflects the
idea that it is di¤erent to maintain the same intermediate inequality from y1 in
country B, with less relative inequality, than from x1 in country A.
Finally, assume that, for some p A 0; 1, in country A the income dis-
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tributions x1 and x2 have the same x1; p-inequality while in country By1 and
y2 have the same y1; p-inequality. Of course, this does not mean that these
two inequality concepts capture the same centrist attitude. If we define aA 
pvx1  1ÿ pe and aB  pvy1  1ÿ pe, then it is easy to verify that, for
example, aBLaA whenever y1Lx1, in which case we can say that aB represents
a more demanding centrist concept.
Proposition 1. Let x0 A D and p0 A 0; 1, so that a0  p0vx0  1ÿ p0e is de-
termined. Let x A G 0a0 so that a0  pvx  1ÿ pe for some p A 0; 1.
i) If y A Px0;p0x  Px;px so that y  x ta0 for some t A R, then y A
G 0a0 and a0  p 0vy  1ÿ p 0e with p 0  pX  t=X  pt. Therefore
p 0  p if p  0 or p  1, and p 0 > p p 0 < p as t > 0 t < 0.
ii) If y B Px0;p0x but y A G 0a0, then p 0V p p 0U p as yLxxLy.
(See the proof in the Appendix).
II.4. Social evaluation functions
A Social Evaluation Function (SEF for short) is a real valued function W
defined on D, with the interpretation that for each income distribution
x;Wx provides the ‘‘social’’ or, simply, the aggregate welfare from a nor-
mative point of view. We need to introduce a social preference for e‰ciency
consistent with the notion of intermediate inequality presented in Sect. II. 3.
We first say that a SEF W : D! R is monotonic along a-rays in Ga, if and
only if for each x A Ga
Wx taVWx for all scalars tV 0:
This property of monotonicity along a-rays corresponds to a preference for
higher incomes keeping a-ray invariant inequality constant. Given x A D and
p A 0; 1, so that a  pvx  1ÿ pe, a SEF W : D! R is called monotonic
along x; p-rays in G 0a, if and only if
Wytpvx1ÿpeVWy for all scalars tV 0 and all y A G 0a:
This property of monotonicity along x; p-rays corresponds to a preference
for higher incomes keeping x; p-inequality constant. For any x A D and p A
0; 1, let Wx;p be the class of SEF satisfying continuity, population replica-
tion invariance, S-concavity and monotonicity along x; p-rays.
III. Operational methods
Let m :  denote the income distribution mean. The following theorem,
inspired in Chakravarty (1988), summarizes the connection between Lorenz
dominance and SEFs in the class Wt;p in the homogeneous case.
Theorem 1. Let t; u A D. The following statements are equivalent:
(1.i) muVmt, and
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(1.ii) there exists some pa A 0; 1 such that, when we define
z  t tpavt  1ÿ pae with t  U ÿ T ;
we have vuLvz.
(2) WuVWt for all W A Wt;pa.
Corollary. Under the conditions of the above Theorem 1,
Wu > Wt for all W A Wt;p with p A pa; 1:
(See the proofs in the Appendix)
How do we apply these results in practice? Let t and u be the initial and the
final income distributions in a given country after a certain period of time. An
empirical situation in which intermediate inequality concepts might prove
useful, arises when u dominates t in the relative Lorenz sense but t dominates
u in the absolute Lorenz sense. Given x0 A D and p0 A 0; 1, suppose that so-
ciety has centrist views according to which we should judge all income dis-
tributions from the point of view of x0; p0-inequality. Assume without loss
of generality that muVmt. If we find that Ix0;p0tV Ix0;p0u, then we
can conclude that WuVWt for all W A Wx0;p0. Otherwise, no interme-
diate welfare conclusion can be obtained.
The problem, of course, is that even if we simplify matters by selecting
x0  t, we do not have any a priori reasons to determine which should be the
p0 value. Our strategy is to use Theorem 1 to allow the data to reveal for
which p values the income distributions u and t have the same t; p-in-
equality. If we are lucky, there will exist some p A 0; 1 such that u  t
tpvt  1ÿ pe with t  U ÿ T . Otherwise, we may find a pair of values in
the unit interval, p1 and p2, with p1 < p2, such that
It;puV It;pt for all p A 0; p1;
It;puU It;pt for all p A p2; 1;
while for any p A p1; p2, u and t are non comparable from the point of view
of t; p-inequality.
A numerical example might be useful at this point. Assume that the data
reveals that t and u are non comparable from the point of view of t; p-in-
equality for p’s in the interval 0:4; 0:7. Consider the center-right inequality
views for which two distributions have the same inequality if, starting from t,
1ÿ 0:7100  30% or less of any excess income is distributed in absolute
terms, and the remaining in relative terms. For all people with such views, in
going from t to u inequality has decreased. For all people with center-left
views, for which at least 1ÿ 0:4100  60% of excess income should be dis-
tributed in absolute terms for intermediate inequality to remain constant, in
going from t to u inequality has increased.
Suppose now that for a di¤erent country in the same period, v and z have
non comparable v; p-inequality for p’s in the interval 0:5; 0:6. We can say
that, relative to the initial situation v, the spectrum of centrist attitudes for
which there has been a reduction in inequality is larger. The same can be said
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of those attitudes for which there has been an increase in inequality. However,
the spectrum of inequality views for which inequality cannot be compared has
decreased. To appreciate the richness of our approach, notice that with pres-
ent techniques we can only say that, in both countries, relative inequality
decreased while absolute inequality increased. Notice also that to reach our
conclusions we do not introduce any new value judgments. What we do is to
allow the data to induce a useful partition in the space of centrist attitudes.
Define the absolute and the relative rays through t;At and Rt, by
At  fx A D : x  t te; t A Rg  Pt;0t;
and
Rt  fx A D : x  t tvt; t A Rg  Pt;1t;
respectively. Let us call a and r the income distributions in At and Rt, re-
spectively, with mean mu. Since we assume that t  U ÿ T > 0, we have
that a  t te and r  t tvt. Define the line segment fa; rg in H-
dimensional space by
fa; rg  fz A D : z  t tpvt  1ÿ pe for some p A 0; 1g
6
p A 0;1Pt;ptX fz A D : mz  mug;
This is the set consisting of all income distributions with mean equal to mu
which can be reached by t; p-rays through t.
The General Case. Notice that the starting situation can be described by the
fact that vaLvuLvr. Assume first that the Lorenz dominance relation vaLvuLvr
is strict. Then there must exist two values p1 A 0; 1 and p2 A p1; 1 which
induce the following partition of fa; rg:
fa; z1g  fz A fa; rg : z  t tpvt  1ÿ pe; p A 0; p1g;
fz1; z2g  fz A fa; rg : z  t tpvt  1ÿ pe; p A p1; p2g;
fz2; rg  fz A fa; rg : z  t tpvt  1ÿ pe; pp2; 1g:
The partition has the following property: vzLvu for all z A fa; z1g; vuLvz for all
z A fz2; rg; and vu is either non comparable to vz for all z A fz1; z2g. Since, for
instance,
fa; z1g 6p A 0;p1Pt;ptX fz A D : mz  mug;
for every z A fa; z1g; It;pz  It;pt for some p A 0; p1. Therefore, as we
wanted:
It;puV It;pt for all p A 0; p1:
Similarly,
It;puU It;pt for all p A p2; 1;
while for any p A p1; p2, u and t are non comparable from the point of view
of t; p-inequality.
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It would be useful to provide a graphical illustration of the general case. In
order not to interrupt the reading of the text, we present a 3-dimensional ex-
ample in the Appendix.
Special cases. If u A fa; rg, then u  t tpvt  1ÿ pe for some p A 0; 1.
Similarly, if there is some z A fr; ag which is Lorenz equivalent to vu, then
p2  p1  p with z  t tpvt  1ÿ pe. In both cases It;pu  It;pt.
On the other hand, if va is Lorenz equivalent to vu, then p1  p2  0; but if va
is non comparable to vu, then there exists no p1 A 0; 1. Similarly, if vu is
Lorenz equivalent to vt, then p1  p2  1, while if vu is non comparable to vt,
then there exists no p2 A 0; 1.
IV. Concluding remarks
Suppose we want to compare two income distributions u and t in two di¤erent
moments of time, and assume that distribution u has a greater mean than t. If
distribution u dominates t in the absolute Lorenz sense, then we believe there
is a consensus that nothing else need to be done. Who would deny that there
has been an unambiguous increase in social welfare? Only people who believe
that to maintain inequality constant any excess income should be distributed
so as to assign greater absolute amounts to the poor than to the rich.
Suppose, however, that distribution u dominates distribution t in the rela-
tive Lorenz sense, but that t dominates u in the absolute Lorenz sense. The
main claim of this paper is that we can improve upon this type of evaluation
without bringing in new value judgments. Conditional on a given income
distribution x, we propose a continuum of inequality notions which can be
intuitively ordered from the relative notion to the absolute one in terms of a
parameter p which varies in the unit interval. Then we provide operational
methods to partition such continuum of inequality notions into subsets with a
clear normative interpretation.
For example, in the Spanish case during the 1980’s we reach the following
result for the total population and an intermediate value of the parameter
Y  0:48. For a rather small set of center-right perceptions of inequality
(according to which inequality remains constant if, say, 13% or less of any
excess income is distributed in absolute amounts while the remaining is dis-
tributed according to the relative shares in the initial situation), inequality has
decreased. For a second set of politically more demanding centrist attitudes
(according to which inequality remains constant if approximately 29% or
more of any excess income is distributed in absolute amounts), inequality has
increased. For the remaining subset of centrist attitudes, inequality in 1990
1991 is equivalent, or statistically indistinguishable, to inequality in 1980
1981. We may take this result as implying that the decrease in inequality in
Spain during this period has been ‘‘small’’.
8 For a discussion of the heterogeneous case and other empirical details (see Del Rı´o
and Ruiz Castillo 1997).
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Whether social welfare went unambiguously down according to measure-
ment instruments consistent with a relative inequality notion, is a very im-
portant piece of knowledge to have. However, in situations like the Spanish
one, to know precisely under which set of centrist value judgments inequality
has increased, decreased, or remained equivalent, generates some value added
worth having. In our opinion, the methodology presented in this paper goes
one step in the direction pointed out by Atkinson (1989), when he indicates
that we ought to follow procedures and, above all, report empirical estimates,
making clear their dependence on the various axioms and value judgments
involved.
Finally, what do we have to say if distribution u is dominated by t in the
relative Lorenz sense? Again, we believe it is worth knowing whether distri-
bution u’s departure from the relative ray through t is ‘‘large’’ or ‘‘small’’.
Think for simplicity in the two dimensional case. We know that the income
share received by the poor in u has decreased. Assume, in addition, that the
absolute amount of income received by the poor person in u has not decreased
relative to t. Consider the set of income distributions in which any excess in-
come is assigned to the rich person in t. They belong to what we may call the
Paretian ray through t. Under the above assumptions, the distribution u lies
somewhere between the Paretian ray and the relative ray through t. The
question we are interested in can now be rephrased as follows: is the distribu-
tion u ‘‘very far’’ apart from the relative ray through t, and therefore ‘‘close’’
to the Paretian ray, reflecting a large increase in inequality? Del Rı´o (1996)
extends the methods presented in this paper to provide an operative answer to
this question.
Appendix
Proposition 1. Let x0 A D and p0 A 0; 1, so that a0  p0vx0  1ÿ p0e is de-
termined. Let x A G 0a0 so that a0  pvx  1ÿ pe for some p A 0; 1.
i) If y A Px0;p0x  Px;px so that y  x ta0 for some t A R, then y A
G 0a0 and a0  p 0vy  1ÿ p 0e with p 0  pX  t=X  pt. Therefore
p 0  p if p  0 or p  1, and p 0 > pp 0 < p as t > 0 t < 0.
ii) If y B Px0;p0x but y A G 0a0, then p 0V p p 0U p as yLxxLy.
Proof of Proposition 1: i) We want to prove that, given a0  pvx  1ÿ pe,
for any y A D with Ix;py  Ix;px, there exists a p A 0; 1 such that,
y  x tp 0ny  1ÿ p 0e:
Taking into account that y  x ta0  x tpvx  1ÿ pe, we have
ny  X
X  t 1 p
t
X
 
nx  1ÿ p t
X  t e
 X  pt
X  t nx  1ÿ
X  pt
X  t
 
e  lnx  1ÿ le;
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with l  X  pt=X  t  X=X  t1ÿ p  p, which implies that lV
p. Rearranging terms and substituting vx in a0  pvx  1ÿ pe we have
a0  p ny
l
ÿ p 1ÿ l
l
e 1ÿ pe  p
l
 
ny  1ÿ p
l
 
e:
Since 0U p=lU 1, it follows that y A G 0a0 and
p 0  p
l
 p
1 t
X
1 p t
X
 p X  t
X  pt :
ii) Since x; y A G 0a0, we can write
a0  p 0ny  1ÿ p 0e  pnx  1ÿ pe:
Assume yLx. By contradiction, suppose that p 0 < p. This means that p 
p 0  e with e > 0. By substituting p in this expression we obtain
p 0ny  1ÿ p 0e  p 0nx  1ÿ p 0e nx ÿ ee:
This implies that vhy > v
h
x for the rich vhx > 1=H and vhy < vhx for the poor
vhx < 1=H in the income distribution x. This means that y can be obtained
from x by transferring income from the poor to the rich, and hence xLy, a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1. Let t; u A D. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1.i) muVmt, and
(1.ii) there exists some pa A 0; 1 such that, when we define
z  t tpant  1ÿ pae with t  U ÿ T ;
we have vuLvz.
(2) WuVWt for all W A Wt;pa.
Corollary. Under the conditions of the above Theorem 1,
Wu > Wt for all W A Wt;p with p A pa; 1:
Proof of Theorem 1: 1 ) 2: As muVmt, for any SEF W A Wt;pa we
have:
Wz Wt U ÿ Tpant  1ÿ paeVWt: 1
Moreover, as u Lorenz-dominates z and both distributions have the same
mean, mu, we know that
WuVWz 2
for any S-concave function, W (see Dasgupta et al. 1973). By combining (1)
and (2), we conclude that
WuVWt for all W A Wt;pa:
2) ) 1: Let x A D and z 0  x U ÿ Xpavt  1ÿ pae. Suppose that
Wx  mxn f z 0; 3
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where nV 0, and f  :  is a continuous, S-concave function satisfying popula-
tion replication invariance. It can be seen that any function W verifying (3) is
monotonic along t; pa rays, so that:
WxUWx t 0paVt  1ÿ pae  mx  t
0
H
 n
f z 0
for any t 0V 0. Notice that continuity, population replication invariance, and
S-concavity of f imply that W satisfies the same properties. Therefore, ex-
pression (3) ensures that function W satisfies the assumptions of the theo-
rem. Since WtUWu, by choosing f   1 we obtain condition (1.i):
Wt  mtn U mun Wu:
On the other hand, if n  0 then we get
Wt  f z 0  f zU f u Wu:
Since mz  mu > 0, and f  is any arbitrary S-concave function, we
conclude that uLz (see Dasgupta et al. 1973). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary: Let p A pa; 1, so that pa  pÿ b for some b > 0. Then
we can write:
pant  1ÿ pae  pnt  1ÿ peÿ bnt ÿ e:
It can be shown that pavt  1ÿ pae is obtained from pvt  1ÿ pe by
using a sequence of order preserving transformations transferring income
from the rich to the poor. Thus, pavt  1ÿ pae strictly dominates pvt
1ÿ pe in the Lorenz sense. Using that
z 0  t tpnt  1ÿ pe; t  U ÿ T ;
we conclude that vz strictly dominates vz 0 in the Lorenz sense. Therefore, under
the assumptions of Theorem 1, the expression
Wt Wz 0 < WzUWu
must hold for any function W A Wt;p, with p A pa; 1. Q.E.D.
A graphical illustration of the empirical procedure in the general case
In an economy consisting of three individuals, the two income distributions at
two moments in time are t  0:5; 1:0; 1:5 and u  8; 9; 13. Clearly, u dom-
inates t according to the relative Lorenz criterion but the opposite is the case
according to the absolute notion.
It is easy to find the vector a A S, such that u  t ta with t  U ÿ T 
30ÿ 3  27. It turns out that a  0:27; 0:29; 0:42. Of course, u and t have
the same a-inequality, but we cannot find a clear intuitive interpretation of
such an statement. In particular, we cannot say whether this means that
inequality has been reduced by a little or by a lot relative to the initial situa-
tion t.
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To understand our approach, it su‰ces to consider the set of income dis-
tributions z with mz  mu  10 in which the individual rankings in t are
preserved. This is the set in Fig. 1 with vertexes 0; 0; 30; 10; 10; 10 and
0; 15; 15. The subset fa; rg is the set of income distributions with mean equal
to 10 which can be reached by t; p-rays through t. In particular, the income
distribution that results from an equal allocation of the extra 27 income units
is a  9:5; 10; 10:5, while the income distribution which preserves the income
shares in t is r  5; 10; 15.
For any z A fa; rg, there exists some p A 0; 1 such that z  t
27pvt  1ÿ pe. That is, every z A fa; rg has been obtained from t by
a meaningful economic procedure: allocating 1ÿ p100% of the extra 27
income units in equal absolute amounts among the three individuals, and the
remaining p100% so as to maintain the income shares in t.
In the example, u B fa; rg. However, the values p1  0:33 and p2  0:56
with the corresponding income distributions z1  8; 10; 12 and z2 
7; 10; 13, induce a partition of fa; rg with the property that zLu for all
z A fa; z1g; uLz for all z A fz2; 1g, and u is Lorenz non comparable with z for
all z A fz1; z2g. The dark zone in Fig. 1 represents income distributions non
comparable with income distribution u. Therefore, we conclude that in going
from t to u income inequality has decreased for centrist attitudes according to
Fig. 1
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which 44% or less of all extra income should be allocated equally among all
individuals, while it has increased for those according to which that percent-
age should be at least equal to 67%. For the remaining attitudes, t and u are
non comparable from the point of view of t; p-inequality. One may say in-
formally that the data have revealed that income inequality has been reduced
by a considerable amount. Therefore, this cardinalization exercise has been
carried out without the help of any new value judgments.
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